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Abstract 
 
Much attention has been paid to ‘blunders’ and ‘policy disasters’. Some argue, on the one 
hand, that the UK’s political and administrative system is disproportionately prone to 
generating disasters, but offer no systematic evidence on the record of failures of policies and 
major public projects in other political systems. On the other hand, research on cognitive 
biases and other failures of collective decision-making has developed highly generic 
frameworks that are used to assess cases of perceived policy failure. Both of these 
perspectives rely on post-hoc assessments of failure and intentions, often from those actors 
involved in the process. This paper develops a comparative perspective on ‘blunders’ in 
government. It does so by (a) developing theory-driven expectations as to the factors that are 
said to encourage ‘failure’, and (b) by devising a systematic framework for the assessment of 
policy processes and outcomes. The paper applies this novel approach to a set of similar 
‘failures’ in particular domains (i.e. in public buildings, transport infrastructure, IT projects, 
benefits/tax systems, and aerospace/defence projects) to assess whether different political-
administrative systems are prone to different kinds of ‘blundering’ or whether there are 
universal patterns in the occurrence of costly and avoidable policy mistakes across policy 
domains. 
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Why do governments blunder? 
Political science is inherently interested in the question as to why things go wrong in 
government. Ranging from the ‘adversary politics’ hypothesis concerning British politics 
(Finer 1975), to studies of implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973) to the more 
comparative attempts at explaining ‘policy fiascoes’ (Gray and t' Hart 1998), scholars have 
been pre-occupied with identifying policy episodes perceived as cases of poor performance 
characterized by flawed planning and management. These episodes are typically considered in 
the light of their particular political features or context. An earlier example might be the call 
for a German-type administrative system by Woodrow Wilson (1887) which was seen as a 
remedy to advance the administration of the emerging US political system. This text was 
‘discovered’ in the 1920s when, again, the capacity of the US political system was under 
challenge. Regardless of era, the conclusion of these various accounts of blunder-prone 
government is, in turn, advocacy of political regime change. For example, changes in 
electoral systems are put forward to encourage change in political style, administrative 
reform, such as calls for more ‘Weberianism’, is seen as enhancing quality, or calls for wider 
changes in the political economy of particular countries are seen as essential in advancing 
economic performance. 
 
Among the most recent, and prominent incarnations of this interest in the question of ‘why we 
are so badly governed’ is King and Crewe’s (2013) The Blunders of our Governments. Their 
account suggests that well-intentioned individuals are inevitably led down the path of policy 
blundering as the British political system discounts deliberation and over-centralises 
executive power. In doing so, they stand in a long line of accounts that suggest that policy-
making in Britain is let down by its own constitutional features. As noted, this tradition can be 
traced back to Finer (1975; also see Hailsham 1976) who suggested that the tendency to 
strong one-party government led to continuous U-turns and policy reversals (which, 
empirically, however remained rather elusive), as governments tend to pursue partisan 
agendas to satisfy activists and party elites. More recent formulations of this argument are 
Dunleavy with his unique brand of commentary criticising the Westminster system as 
offering the ‘fastest law of the west’ and an incomplete set of checks and balances (Dunleavy 
1994) and Moran’s (2001; 2003) analysis of political and institutional causes of policy 
catastrophes in the age of The British Regulatory State. What is common to this tradition of 
thinking is the view that the British political system is prone to large-scale, avoidable and 
  
expensive policy mistakes which stem from over-confidence, ambitions of high politics, and 
the clubbish nature of decision-making across governing institutions.
1
 
 
The problems with the literature on government ‘failure’ and ‘blunders’ are multiple. Take the 
literature on the British state and its multiple diagnosed failings as an example. First, the 
literature usually reflects on the political position of the author within the British political 
system. An emphasis on blunders and other dysfunctionalities of the British political system 
are typically put forward by those sceptical of the majoritarian characteristics of the 
Westminster system. Second, the frequent recourse to anecdotal reminiscence of key actors, 
rationalizing their own role in decision-making after the event is arguably flawed as a method. 
Regardless of method, a pure reliance on the wisdom of hindsight may betray the 
uncertainties that shaped the context of decision-making.  Third, assertions are made that 
Britain's political system is particularly blunder-prone - without offering real (or any) 
comparative evidence, a point originally made by Gray (1996). In other words, the implied 
argument is that different political systems are in some kind of ‘blunder’-race with Britain 
leading the way, whereas other countries subject to more ‘gridlock’ (or more consensual 
styles of politics) are lagging behind and enjoy greater policy success (or at least fewer 
catastrophic failures). However, it is not clear whether Britain is lonely at the top when it 
comes to government blundering and dysfunction. For example, readers of Hacker and 
Pierson’s (2010) Winner-Take-All-Politics might similarly suggest that the US system is 
particularly flawed (and arguably with more highly significant societal consequences), while 
Jones and Baumgartner (2005) point to the erratic pattern of political attention across 
institutions. Fourth, what is actually a blunder is also difficult to define as relevant time 
periods are hard to establish /define, and official and intended outcomes may conceal other 
motives and side-effects. Peter Hall's (1980) seminal Great Planning Disasters opened with 
the example of the blunder-ridden construction and public financing of the Sydney Opera 
House, before acknowledging that the project ultimately had been a great triumph when 
measured against more subjective and long-term iconic grounds. Finally, the reasons for 
‘blunders’, ‘disasters’, ‘fiascos’, ‘catastrophes’ and ‘failure’ are rarely investigated in any 
major systemic way; at best, lists of the different ‘failure mechanisms’ are presented and then 
associated with a variety of cases.  
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 Somewhat differently, in the 1970s, it was argued that it was the lack of capacity of the state in being able to 
govern the economy that explained the British relative decline and the absence of major projects. This was either 
due to ‘overload’ or due to the lack of linkages between government and finance/industry (King 1975; Hayward 
1976). 
  
 
This is not to say that we dispute the diagnosis of 'failure', 'fiasco' or 'disaster' in any one 
particular case. We also do not want to appear as apologists for one particular political system 
over another; however. Instead, the following should therefore be seen as a call for a 
genuinely comparative analysis of the cases, and therefore identification of particular 
mechanisms. Whether political systems appear to generate more or less, or particular types of 
failure is, ultimately, an empirical question. 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT BLUNDERING 
In the following discussion, we develop four complementary perspectives on governmental 
and policy ‘blundering’.  As starting point, we assume that decision-making always takes 
place under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty. In other words, we assume that 
probabilities of particular events occurring cannot be easily calculated, and neither can their 
impact. Decision-making processes are characterised by pre-existing norms and worldviews, 
fluid participation, and strategic and self-interested actors. Furthermore, we assume that most 
decision-making in government deals with ‘wicked issues’ (Rittel and Webber 1973), they are 
inherently about value trade-offs and multiple contradictory dimensions and objectives. In 
order to explore different dimensions of blundering we distinguish between sources of 
blundering on two dimensions. We distinguish between those sources for blundering 
according to whether a lack of resources or a high degree of resource depletion can be 
associated with blundering. Furthermore, we can distinguish sources for blundering in terms 
of whether supposed blunders are caused by the (tragic) choices of individuals, or by actors 
whose actions are channeled through the inherent characteristics of politico-administrative 
systems (such as the ‘Westminster system’). Table 1 points to these two dimensions and the 
four resultant sources for policy blundering. We explore each of these four perspectives in 
more detail below. 
 
Table 1: Four Types of Government Blunder 
 No Resource Issues High Resource Issues 
Blunder due to particular choices Hyper-Excited Politics Instrument Choice 
Blunder due to underlying 
structures/systemic features 
Constitutional System Administrative Capacity 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The four perspectives on blundering point to various reasons as to why policy decisions can 
go ‘wrong’. In the case of hyper-excited politics the source of failure lies in intentional 
choices by individuals or groups of individuals. This choice is associated with ‘moral panics’, 
Pavlovian politics and other external pressures that make politicians and official rush policy 
announcements only to repent at leisure when these commitments turn out to be counter-
productive, more costly than expected, fail to achieve intended outcomes, or generate no 
interest (see Cohen 1972; 2002; Lodge and Hood 2005; Breyer 2003; Sunstein and 
Zeckhauser 2011). Examples include policy over-reactions to perceived risks such as mobile 
phones or high profile announcements to provide public funding for flood victims which are 
never taken up. Similarly, the context of iconic or symbolic politics is often associated with 
hyper-excited blundering (Moran 2001; Jennings 2013). Politicians (and senior 
administrators) in the realm of high politics are motivated by the possibility of creating 
signature projects or legacies (whether this is in terms of buildings, enduring reforms to 
welfare or tax systems, events or other high-profile projects) and, therefore, are prone to 
optimism bias in discounting potential disadvantages and costs. Specifically, ‘fast-thinking’ 
(Kahneman 2013) by key decision-makers acting under political pressure may make them 
vulnerable to cognitive biases, such as disproportionately ‘locking-on’ to particular bits of 
information (see Jones 1994 for a wider discussion of bounded rationality in policy-making).
2
  
 
Blundering due to particular features of the constitutional system is often put forward as 
accounting for the record of failure in British central government (see Dunleavy 1994; King 
and Crewe 2013), as noted earlier. Similarly, the wider literature on ‘credible commitment’ 
and ‘veto points’ has suggested that some political systems are more likely to witness policy 
reversals than others, and therefore to be more prone to U-turns and other policy 
inconsistencies (e.g. Weaver and Rockman 1993; Pierson 2001; Tsebelis 2002). The 
propensity towards ‘strong government’ is seen as problematic as it reduces deliberation 
opportunities and therefore also the information available to decision-makers, as well as 
failing to check over-enthusiastic and over-confident executives. Elsewhere, Janis (1972) 
famously notes insularity of collective decision-making as a source of blundering in foreign 
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 Note that this view of 'fast' and 'slow' thinking is disputed. In areas of genuine uncertainty, fast thinking (or 
heuristics) is the superior strategy. It might be argued that the large scale projects represent a large series of 
loosely coupled and decentralised decisions, made under conditions of ambiguity (i.e. uncertainty). However, 
initial choices in terms of embarking on a particular mega-project might be seen as somewhat different to 
genuine choices in uncertainty that might apply to financial meltdowns, natural catastrophes or military 
invasions, for example. 
  
policy although this insularity was arguably less a result of the constitutional system. While, 
therefore, majoritarian systems are seen, especially from a British perspective, as problematic, 
a similar case can be made for consensus systems. Here, the need to bargain and seek 
consensus is seen as delaying decisions, requiring side-payments and pork-barreling, and 
slowing down the business of government.  
 
Instrument choice as a source of blundering is associated with explanations that suggest the 
‘wrong tools for the job’ have been chosen for the policy problem or objective in question. 
Here blunders are caused, or could be avoided, because an inappropriate or sub-optimal 
method, such as a regulatory standard or economic incentive (e.g. taxes, subsidies) is chosen 
to achieve the desired effect. Policy instruments differ in terms of their degree of 
‘coerciveness’ and ‘depletability’ (Hood 1983; Hood and Margetts 2007). For example, using 
advertising campaigns to change behaviours is somewhat ‘cheaper’ than extensive policing, 
backed by a highly punitive enforcement approach.  Similarly, the use of highly punitive and 
visible punishment might not just require the creation of a particular enforcement machinery, 
but it is also likely to trigger resistance and avoidance, requiring, in turn, further repressive 
organisational tools. In other words, the less the degree of social acceptance of the chosen 
policy and its instruments, the more likely it is that there will be extensive gaming and 
counter-learning (Hood 1976). Furthermore, the use of long-term fixed contracts, such as in 
the case of public-private partnerships, may shift the financial burden from current to future 
generations (something which could interact with cognitive biases, such as the hyperbolic 
discounting of future costs). Indeed, instrument choice also links to wider organisational 
features, namely the dispersion of responsibility for particular activities. Hood (1976) has 
noted problems associated with ‘multi-organisational sub-optimisation’ -- where the activities 
of multiple organisations across multiple domains are interdependent without necessarily 
being aware of, or sharing, each other's objectives. Similarly, Pressman and Wildavsky’s 
(1973) classic implementation study noted how the ‘wrong’ instrument, namely one with too 
many ‘clearance points’ was inevitably leading to a disappointing policy outcome.  
 
Finally, blunders are often associated with a lack of administrative capacity. Administrative 
capacity is related to bureaucratic organisation and competence. This factor therefore differs 
from instruments in that the latter relate to the resource implications of particular modes of 
policy intervention. Administrative capacity, in contrast, relates to the skills and capabilities 
that are expected to exist within bureaucracies. In other words, a lack of administrative 
capacity is defined by the unavailability of relevant and suitable skills within public and 
  
private organizations, issues with communication and co-ordination within and across 
organisations in the design and delivery of policies, and the ability to monitor ongoing 
policies and projects. Information-gathering, - sharing, and -processing are inherently 
demanding and resource-intensive, especially in the context of governments’ scarce attention 
(see Jones and Baumgartner 2005; 2014). A lack of co-ordination capacity might be said to lie 
at the heart of failures of collaboration between different government agencies and private 
and para-public bodies. Co-ordination capacities are also at the heart of problems of ‘turf’ in 
government. For example, silos in cross-agency intelligence sharing were identified by the 
9/11 Commission as a key factor in the failures that led to the attack on the US on September 
11
th
. Elsewhere, in the British context, Dunleavy (1994) identifies the loss of institutional 
memory due to an almost never-ending cycle of administrative restructuring and reform as a 
major limit on administrative capacity. A lack of administrative capacity might also be linked 
to a lack of staff in policing certain activities (such as undertaking food inspections).For 
example,  a lack of civil service expertise in procurement is often attributed as a factor in cost 
overruns in major IT projects and large defence contracts (e.g. Margetts 2012). 
 
More generally, one can distinguish administrative capacity in a variety of types: (i) 
regulatory, (ii) delivery, (iii) co-ordination, and (iv) analytical (Lodge and Wegrich 2014). 
Accordingly, blundering may emerge due to (i) dysfunctional oversight activities, (ii) 
insufficient resources to engage at the policy frontline, (iii) an inability to bring together and 
maintain a diverse set of actors, or (iv) failures of imagination due to a lack of technical 
capacity to process information and forecast trends. 
 
How does this framework for analysis differ from existing studies of blundering 
governments? The preponderance in the literature places the state and the underlying 
constitutional framework at the heart of its analysis. For Dunleavy (1994), for example, the 
‘fastest law in the West’ facilitated the passage of major public sector reforms, therefore, 
worsening the potential effects of determined decision-making within a more or less veto-
point free context. For Moran (2001; 2003), the ‘incomplete penetration of the regulatory 
state’ logic within the informal logics of the Westminster system has generated its own 
dysfunctionalities and ‘catastrophes’. For King and Crewe (2013), the constitutional system 
facilitates rather than hinders over-excited politicians and civil servants. We do not suggest 
that such reinforcing processes do not matter, but we suggest that in order to establish 
whether the ‘constitution’ is to blame, we need to focus on these aspects in more detail, and 
cross-nationally, in order to understand the nature of hyper-excited politics in non-
  
Westminster systems. We also need to better understand the role of instrument choice, 
administrative capacity and hyper-excited politics, in order to assess the contributing or 
enabling role of the constitutional setting of policy blunders.   
 
A METHOD FOR ANALYSIS 
How might one approach analysis of the conditions associated with policy disasters? Given 
that even in apparently blunder-prone settings policy disasters are relatively rare events 
compared to the usual politics of the mundane, it is necessary to find a way of sampling them. 
One option would be to examine the properties of all policies of a given government for a 
defined period, evaluate which might be considered disastrous against a defined set of criteria 
and then record the associated set of contributing factors that led to the blunder. This would 
enable us to consider how blunders differ from the wider population of policies that are less 
(visibly) problematic. Such an approach would be highly resource intensive, however, since 
policy disasters make up just a small proportion of the overall population, and because 
collecting comparable data for all policies would be impractical. In order to properly 
understand the causal factors leading to each disaster one would need to conduct some sort of 
process-tracing on each case. It would also require us to compare disasters within populations 
of policies across multiple systems in order to determine whether constitutional design 
features are a source of blundering. Unlike comparative studies of outcome factors, such as 
cost overruns (e.g. Flyvbjerg et al. 2002), we cannot simply use indicators to determine the 
underlying cause of policy failure. It quickly becomes apparent, then, that a classic 
comparative study is out of the question. What are the alternative options? The problems of 
selecting on dependent variable are well-established (Geddes 1990; King et al. 1994), as this 
gives rise to no-variance in the outcome variable. For our purposes, however, examining a 
sample of prominent policy disasters from across a range of contexts provides a test of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions (Dion 1998) for the occurrence of policy disasters. In 
other words, selecting a set of known blunders as our case enables us to determine whether 
there is an observable pattern of contributing factors that reveal similarities or differences 
across a range of contexts and underlying conditions. Our cases are, therefore, drawn from a 
number of policy domains and countries. First, while there is no single agreed definition of 
blunders, disasters, fiascos or catastrophes, what is shared across most studies is the sense that 
these are large-scale, foreseeable errors/mistakes of either omission or unintended 
consequences (see Hall 1980; Gray 1996; King and Crewe 2013). We therefore identified 
cases which might be categorised as having been ‘disastrous’ in terms of cost and time in the 
following sorts of public policies or projects: (i) public buildings and stadiums, (ii) transport 
  
infrastructure, (iii) IT projects, (iv) benefits/tax systems and financial regulation, and (v) 
aerospace/defence projects. Admittedly, none of the decision-making in these cases is likely 
to have directly caused death or disease. These areas are also somewhat different to other 
examples of ‘failure’, such as ‘poor’ regulation, military adventures, or misdirected, complex 
welfare programmes. Additionally, the severity of blundering varies considerably across the 
cases, which range from extreme outliers in terms of completion and cost overruns to modest 
failures of management or decision-making that incurred smaller costs but rather more in the 
way of political embarrassment. Our cases are accordingly given a score between 0.0 and 1.0 
for the degree of blundering that was involved. This is not purely a measure of losses since it 
is impossible to calculate a universal unit of policy disaster (i.e. is a 50% cost overrun better 
or worse than a one year delay in project completion?). Rather it indicates the overall severity 
of the failings of planners and managers (such as the extent to which cost inflation was 
foreseeable or the frequency with which warnings were missed).        
 
Our cases were drawn from six countries: Britain, France, the US, Germany, Canada, 
Australia; with some of the policies falling under the jurisdiction of national government and 
others being controlled by subnational, regional or local government.  Through this selection 
of countries, we are able to observe the factors associated with policy disasters across federal-
presidential and semi-presidential systems, and in unitary- and federal-parliamentary systems. 
This approach allows us to test whether the presence or absence of particular conditions (i.e. 
instruments, system-features, hyper-excited politics or administrative capabilities) is common 
across all cases. This will further enable us to demonstrate the degree of contingency 
associated with government blundering if common patterns are not observed. It also will 
enable us to determine whether particularly severe policy blunders are associated with 
particular causes whereas more modest blunders are associated with a different set of 
conditions. 
 
Categorising Hyper-Excitement, Instruments, Constitutional Systems and Administrative 
Capacity  
Having identified a set of cases we classify each of the conditions associated with the 
occurrence of policy disaster. Was hyper-excited politics involved? What was the instrument 
chosen to deliver the policy? What features of the constitutional system exacerbated or 
restricted the blunder? Where the capabilities of bureaucrats at fault? This requires us simply 
to determine whether or not a particular factor is present in the case of a given policy disaster. 
For each case, then, we complete the relevant information for each of the quadrants in Table 2 
  
(see below). Having addressed this dichotomous question, we then assign a weight to the 
variable (taking a value between 0 and 1.0) which provides a subjective evaluation of how 
significant the factor was in leading to the blunder. This draws upon Ragin’s (2000) method 
of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). On the basis of inspection of contemporaneous 
accounts and subsequent inquiries, this serves to indicate how much each factor contributed to 
the policy disaster. As we will show, not only does this enable systematic comparison across 
cases it also enables the identification of multiple permutations of combinations of covariates 
that are associated with a particular output value. 
 
Table 2: Examples of Four Types of Government Blunder 
 No Resource Issues High Resource Issues 
Blunder due to particular choices Hyper-Excited Politics: 
Short-term political response to a  
tabloid newspaper campaigns 
 
Political backing for a project 
designed to win over voters 
 
Ideological preference for a 
programme of privatisation leads to 
disregard of evidence and/or 
opposition  
 
Project seen as a legacy for the 
politician making the decision to 
adopt or abandon it 
Instrument Choice: 
Use of a private finance initiative 
imposes a long-term financial burden 
on government 
 
Public/private partnership creates 
moral hazard where government 
bears the financial risk 
 
Reliance on private financing for a 
high risk venture with uncertain 
revenues 
  
Blunder due to underlying 
structures/systemic features 
Constitutional System: 
Policy/project not subject to 
sufficient checks and balances  
 
Fast-tracking of legislation possible 
due to the political system 
 
Complex political distribution of 
responsibility between national and 
local government creates ambiguity 
in implementation and blame 
avoidance behaviour  
Administrative Capacity: 
Bureaucrats inattentive to the 
development of problems with a 
project. 
 
Lack of capacity for subjecting initial 
budget forecasts to scrutiny. 
 
Government reliant on private firms 
and industry sectors for 
delivering/administering policy (e.g. 
security for major events) 
 
 
 
QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWENTY-THREE POLICY 
BLUNDERS 
As noted, we focus on a range of cases that have attracted the label ‘failure’ and ‘disaster’. 
These range from transport infrastructure, defence, IT systems to financial regulation and 
  
public buildings.  In the following, we do not provide for a blow-by-blow account for each of 
the individual cases. Rather, we focus solely on the four potential explanations, outlined 
above. Details of the cases are summarized in the Appendix Table A1. 
 
 
Hyper-excited politics 
As noted already, hyper-excited politics are associated with media pressure, moral panics or 
some form of over-enthusiastic commitment towards a particular policy or project. While 
none of our cases represents a ‘Pavlovian’ response in the sense of policy (over) reacting to 
repeated incidents, there is nevertheless considerable evidence of politicians or governments 
making decisions in view of leaving a potential ‘legacy’; what Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) call a 
'monument complex' and what Moran (2001) calls 'iconic politics'. This is particularly the 
case with infrastructure projects, such as the Berlin airport or the Hamburg and Sydney 
concert halls. In the cases of the Sydney Opera House, Australian Parliament House, 
Millennium Dome and Scottish Parliament at Holyrood, political keenness to get projects off 
the ground before designs had been finalised or properly assessed was a factor in cost 
overruns and subsequent problems experienced in development of the project (in the case of 
the Dome, which largely came in on budget, it meant that the structure was built with little 
idea of the exhibition that would eventually fill it). President Mitterrand's ambition to 
construct a national library as part of a series of 'Grand Projets' across Paris was similarly 
legacy-driven. Indeed the contract for le Bibliotheque  Nationale de France was written in 
such a way as to ensure no future president could alter the plans (Fitchett 1995). In addition, 
the prospect of winning the right to host international mega-events, such as the FIFA World 
Cup or the Olympic Games, are often a trigger for hyper-excited politics as bids make over-
optimistic forecasts of costs and economic benefits (Preuss 2008; Jennings 2012a; 2012b). Of 
our cases, both the London and Montreal Olympics were entangled with high politics and the 
aspirations of leaders at the national or local level to host grand spectacles. The Sochi 2014 
Winter Olympics was similarly conceived as a legacy for President Putin (Hille 2014) and to 
showcase modern Russia, with costs spiralling to $50 billion. While political enthusiasm 
might be a factor in the cases included in this study, it does not explain why politicians are 
able to mobilise support for some bids, but fail to do so for others; such as the decision by the 
Norwegian city of Oslo to withdraw from the competition to host the 2022 Winter Olympics. 
At best, hyper-excited politics in the case of mega-events as well as large-scale technical 
systems seem to require some encouragement from businesses, sporting authorities or other 
organised interests. Finally, many policy blunders are linked to policy-makers pursuing 
legacies that offer a symbolic political statement: such as providing a clear signal that 
  
devolution was irreversible through the construction of the Scottish Parliament (Fraser 2004, 
p. 418), and the desire of the British and French governments to demonstrate their 
technological and engineering prowess through the Concord project in the 1960s. The same 
can be said about the German Transrapid project. This magnetic levitation-based technology 
was widely promoted as a 'technology of the future' that would also offer export opportunities 
to German industry, once a German service had been into operation. Eventually, no link was 
every built in Germany, but the continued political support for such a technologies whose 
advantages were increasingly reduced by cheaper air-traffic and incremental advances in 
traditional rail technology points to a degree of hyper-excited politics.  
 
Hyper-excitement might therefore be a critical factor in defining the context in which 
decisions regarding major projects or policies are taken. This matters for the classic problem 
of 'optimism bias' (Flyvbjerg et al. 2013), which can lead to the adoption of risky projects and 
systematic under-estimation of project costs. Furthermore, hyper-excited politics also matters 
in terms of processes of project management throughout the construction process. The Sydney 
Opera House and Hamburg philharmonic orchestra building both suffered as a consequence 
of political excitement regarding the ‘uniqueness’ of the original architectural designs which 
led to considerable cost overruns. The use of pioneering construction techniques for 
Montreal's Olympic Stadium likewise contributed to the cost overruns (COJO '78). Similarly, 
the British-French inter-governmental agreement for the Concorde project meant that an 
inherently uneconomic project was persisted with despite its costs rising (indeed the project 
gave rise to the term the ‘Concord fallacy’ to describe the escalation of commitments despite 
negative consequences. In turn, the high political excitement regarding the Millennium Dome, 
with the ambitious claims of the Blair government that it would showcase a 'New Britain', did 
not lead to constructions problems, but arguably set the stage for wider criticism and political 
embarrassment. Somewhat differently, the desire to make a ‘statement’ regarding unification 
and relocation of the German capital to Berlin contributed to the conditions of the long 
drawn-out construction process of a new airport for Berlin. Indeed, the urge to appear 
‘modern’ by advocating supposedly new public-private partnerships, and deliver a reduced 
burden for taxpayers, was also at the heart of other contemporary policy disasters, as 
illustrated in the case of TollCollect. Here, ministers were keen to illustrate their ‘modern’ 
way of policy-making via delegating the development of the toll-collecting systems for road 
haulage to the private sector. Despite this, the project suffered delays and legal disputes with 
the contractor. However, this contrasts with an example of eventual abandonment, namely the 
Transrapid. 
  
 
Less evidence of hyper-excitement exists when it comes to the long-term defence projects 
among our cases. The Eurofighter project emerged in the context of the cold war, and was 
criticised for not reflecting on Glasnost let alone, even after 1989, the collapse of 
communism. The U-turn regarding the decision on the aircraft/carrier combination for 
Britain's Carrier Strike project resulted from a new government -- seeking to make savings for 
its austerity programme -- overturning a decision by its predecessor, only to later reverse its 
own decision as costs escalated. 
 
In short, hyper-excited politics do not offer a complete explanation for policy disasters or 
blunders. Politicians in heat might prefer to engage in funding promises (such as for flood 
defences) or legislative and regulatory initiatives. However, when it comes to long-term 
projects, such as the kind of cases that are of interest in this study, hyper-excitement is 
typically linked to an appetite for making symbolic legacy commitments, presenting high-end 
technological fixes to supposed problems, and constructing iconic monuments, which leads in 
turn to over-optimistic statements regarding their viability and limited cost implications. This, 
in turn, sets the stage for a reluctance to reverse decisions and abandon projects.  
 
Constitutional politics 
As noted, one of the standard accusations is that political systems generate their own policy 
side-effects and dysfunctionalities. Majoritarian systems are said to generate ‘fastest laws of 
the west’, while consensus-based system encourage log-rolling and pork-barrels. Whereas 
Moran (2003) in his orchestral British Regulatory State notes several examples of 
dysfunctional dynamics involving the Westminster/Whitehall system, examples of blunders in 
consensus systems are less well-known. One prominent case, however, is the train station at 
Montabaur, Germany on the high-speed link between Cologne and Frankfurt which was 
largely a result of continuous lobbying by then Prime Minister Rudolf Scharping, then a fast-
rising social democrat politician (Sorge 2007). The previously unknown town subsequently 
developed as a destination for commuters and also attracted business investment. A similar 
example is observed in the case of Britain’s new aircraft carriers, in which industrial politics 
influenced lobbying over which shipyards would build different parts – which include Rosyth 
shipyard was in the neighboring constituency to then prime minister Gordon Brown – despite 
uncertainty over funding for the aircraft to accompany them (The Scotsman 2007), let alone 
type of aircraft. Clientelism can be a serious problem for the governance of large projects 
whereby contracts and public assets are exchanged for political support. In the aftermath of 
  
the recent Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, toxic assets financed by oligarchs have been 
transferred back to the state, with taxpayers footing the bill (Vasilyeva 2015). 
 
However, in the cases of interest to our study, constitutional politics are remarkably absent:  
different political systems generate similar dynamics and results. The Sydney and Hamburg 
concert halls display rather similar dynamics despite emerging in rather different federal 
contexts. The new Scottish and Australian Parliament buildings experienced similar problems 
in procurement despite distinct political contexts. Some policy blunders emerge as a result of 
international politics, such as the Eurofighter, where British government-influenced (and 
Rolls Royce-driven) technical specifications added further to the cost basis of the project. As 
in the cases of the British aircraft carriers or Concorde, international projects potentially 
increased the reluctance to abandon projects, or to reject continuous project amendments. 
 
Similarly, accusations of limited political oversight emerge across all political systems. One 
key example is the Berlin-Brandenburg airport with its shared political responsibilities, 
involving two Land governments (Berlin and Brandenburg) as well as the federal 
government. However, while such a shared mixed system was present in other cases, the basic 
problem reflected general failure in the oversight capacities of government when it comes to 
monitoring the activities of those in charge of constructing or operating major projects. 
Indeed, a shared characteristic is that projects seem to go ‘off budget’ mostly due to the 
complexity of the project management, rather than simply because of lack of political interest. 
Indeed, institutional structures are often in place for assurance, such as in the collapse of the 
West Coast Mainline rail franchise competition in Britain (Public Affairs Select Committee 
2013, p. 8), but are not adhered to. Indeed, the UK government’s Major Projects Authority 
reviewed the franchise competition and gave it a green rating. The Millennium Dome is 
something of an exception, with the decision to proceed with the project taken in Cabinet at 
the instigation of the Prime Minister – absent of proper checks and balances – and with the 
Millennium Commission overriding assessments by their accounting officer that further 
bailouts to the floundering project could not be justified on ‘value for money’ grounds 
(Moran 2001, p. 418). Overall, therefore, the cases under discussion do not display the kind of 
characteristics that would be predicted by the literature. Disasters occur in similar ways across 
constitutional systems. 
 
Instrument Choice 
  
A number of explanations exist as to why policy instruments can go wrong. One is the 
continuous complaint that politics is a continuous source for ongoing project modifications 
and scope creep. As a result, one key choice has been to create ‘credible commitment’ via 
contractual arrangements that impose costs on project changes. Those projects that are not 
associated with fixed prices or penalty clauses for contractors are seen as inevitable inviting 
cost increases. Indeed, one of the key charges in construction of the Sydney and Hamburg 
opera houses was that ongoing technical refinements to designs were waved through by 
project managers. Global economic shocks impacted on the costs of construction of 
Montreal’s Olympic stadium and on private financing of the Olympic Village for the London 
2012 Olympics (and the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics) where firms withdrew from the 
project until financial risks had faded. In contrast, the way in which iniitial contracts were 
written reduced  incentives for later ‘cheating’ by contractors on Mitterrand’s national library. 
The Australian Parliament House construction followed a ‘fast track’ procurement process 
similar to that for the Scottish Parliament (Fraser 2004; Audit Scotland 2004), which was 
ineffective in containing costs incurred by contractors. Most problems in instrument choices 
involve relationships with private firms, such as the volume of orders. Spiraling costs of 
production (e.g. Eurofighter) or rising prospective operational costs (e.g. Concorde) led to 
cancellations that, in turn, triggered calls for compensation payments by the industry.  
 
The delay in the introduction of the TollCollect system led to considerable legal battles 
between the federal government and the private consortium. The project itself was eventually 
seen as successful overall and was, without much consultation, renewed in 2014 for a further 
three years (raising, in turn, concerns about the too close relationship with industry). 
However, an ongoing legal battle pitted the government, which required compensation for 
lost earnings, against the industry which objected to the federal government’s decision to 
withhold payments in lieu of lost earnings. These legal proceedings began in 2005, were held 
in secret and remained unresolved at the time of writing. 
 
Most of the processes covered in this study involved the creation of ‘company’-type vehicles 
that sought to manage the process of organising the construction of the project in question. 
This sort of instrument was involved in the case of the Millennium Dome, Edinburgh’s tram 
system, both the Montreal and London Olympics, the Channel Tunnel, the Scottish 
Parliament building, the Sydney Opera House, and the Hamburg concert hall. Few of our 
cases were undertaken within government directly (though the Bibliothèque nationale de 
France, Universal Credit and West Coast Main Line rail franchise competition are 
  
exceptions). The key problem in these cases involved the capacity of these arms-length 
vehicles to manage highly complex processes and to make choices about when to inform 
political principals about delays and over-runs. The Berlin-Brandenburg airport was initially 
to be constructed by a private consortium, led by Hochtief. Following a court ruling declaring 
this initial tendering outcome illegal, the various governments were required to take on 
responsibility for the overall project, creating a company to manage the construction process. 
However, a high degree of contractual complexity across parties, the tendency to develop 
highly complex technical solutions and a lack of managerial oversight (and evidence of 
corruption) created the conditions for a policy disaster. The development of the Millennium 
Dome similarly led British government to create a private company to build and operate the 
national exhibition. A similar tendency towards complexity was evident in various IT 
disasters in the UK, for example (in a case not (yet) included in our list), in 2015 the online 
system of the Rural Payments Agency had to be turned into a paper-only system following 
technical problems and complaints. 
 
It can also been argued that the case of the West Coast Mainline franchising episode 
represents an example of instrument failure, with perverse incentives generated by a complex 
franchising system that meant that the initial winning bid was encouraged to bid on highly 
optimistic terms with regards of future growth. While this was a convenient excuse (for the 
Labour party) to campaign for the abandonment of the particular franchising system that was 
governing the British railways in the 2010s, this particular episode was ultimately more a case 
of a lack of administrative capacities (see below) as well as about interdependencies with 
other high profile projects, namely a planned high speed train line. That is, it was alleged that 
over-optimistic assumptions were copied from the plans of the (troubled) high speed line and 
used for the franchising process. 
 
More generally, the discretion to choose instruments is often severely constrained, in 
particular by EU state aid and competition rules. These added constraints and complexity, and 
therefore further sources for disaster (such as the Berlin-Brandenburg airport). However, it is 
difficult to suggest the contextual limits on instrument choice were solely ‘at fault’ for the 
extent of blundering we observe. Instruments therefore matter in the sense of introducing their 
own vulnerabilities and complexities; however, it is difficult to suggest that they were, in their 
own, responsible for generating policy disasters. 
 
Administrative Capacity 
  
As noted above, administrative capacity is associated with a willingness to challenge and 
scrutinise proposals – and to deliver them. Across all our cases, it can be questioned as to why 
senior officials and politicians did not ask more probing questions or scrutinize proposals 
more deeply. If one was to use only critical reports by the National Audit Office (NAO) to 
explore UK-based disasters, then one would easily get the impression that ‘administration’ 
was largely at fault. However, as the remit of the NAO prohibits it from commenting on 
political choices, one has to probe more deeply into the ways in which a lack of 
administrative capacity contributed to each blunder, beyond that of an initial political 
decision. For example, the West Coast Mainline rail franchising disaster was blamed on a 
lack of administrative capacity (see Public Accounts Select Committee 2013; National Audit 
Office 2012). Civil servants were suspended, the lack of financial resources to employ 
consultants was bemoaned, the modelling behind calculations was questioned, and the 
franchising process was challenged.  
 
The implementation of the Universal Credit scheme to simplify the system for working-age 
benefits in the UK suffered badly from a high rate of turnover of senior leadership and a lack 
of IT expertise more generally, along with a ‘fortress’ mentality among the programme team 
(NAO 2013). Visitor and ticket sale forecasts for the Dome were also got badly wrong by 
planners (NAO 2000), while Home Office development of the identity cards scheme spent a 
substantial amount on contractors because it did not have “certain skill sets and resources 
necessary for implementation of a large and complex project such as Identity Cards (Public 
Accounts Select Committee 2006, p. 11). The lack of administrative capacity in these cases 
should also be seen in the context of a reduced capacity to recruit external expertise, demand 
by government for ‘good news’ in a hostile political environment, and the inherent 
complexity of each of the projects.  
 
Elsewhere, there is evidence of a lack of administrative capacity to stand up to political and 
interest group pressures, even though resistance to projects was well-informed and present. In 
the case of the Eurofighter project, the initial advocacy involved a manufacturer that was, at 
the time, part-owned by the Bavarian government. A lack of resources and a reluctance of 
government to engage with planners was said to have provided for a ‘waving through’ 
response to changes to technical specifications of the project, which led to cost overruns. In 
light of all this, policy disasters may not just emerge from over-excitably policy-makers but 
also from failures of resources and expertise in administration, such as in forecasting and 
project management. Instead, they frequently emerge as a result of weak challenges to 
  
planning assumptions and awarding of green lights to complicated and risky projects due to a 
lack of depth in administrative scrutiny, whether due to political sensitivities, industry 
pressure, over-enthusiastic project designers or failure to manage disparate sets of agencies 
and contractors. 
 
More generally, though, none of these projects led to policy disasters simply because ‘the 
state’ was in charge. Indeed budget forecasting and project management seems to be 
problematic for both the public and private sectors. Instead, shortcomings in administrative 
capacity were often down to a lack of interest and engagement by oversight boards, senior 
leadership, project teams and individual officials that structured problems experienced with 
these large projects. One may therefore suggest that administrative capacity presents a generic 
constraint in contrast to an argument that would claim that some types of systems are more 
prone than others, due to, for example, extensive managerialist reforms. 
 
If we summarise our qualitative assessment of the causal importance of each of these four 
sources of blundering, as presented in Table 3, it is apparent that some factors are far more 
recurrent and impactful than others. Here we employ a fuzzy set approach (Ragin 2000), 
assigning each factor a score for the degree to which it is considered to be a contributing or 
critical factor to the policy blunder. The sets take values of 0.0 (not a contributing factor at all 
or not event present in the case), 0.1 (a minor factor), 0.3 (not that important, but played a 
role), 0.5 (one of the main contributing factors, but in itself not critical), 0.7 (a significant 
cause of the blunder, but exacerbated by presence of one or more other conditions, even 
minor), 0.9 (the predominant underlying single or conjoint cause of failure), and 1.0 
(indisputably the critical and major factor in the blunder, with all other factors incidental). 
 
From inspection of the average score for each factor we see that constitutional politics lags 
behind substantially (at 0.3), compared with instrument choice (0.5) and hyper-excited 
politics (0.6) and administrative capacity (0.6). If we simply correlate the fuzzy set score 
against the severity of the blunder (as shown if the first column) we see that the correlation is 
much higher for instrument choice (0.6) compared to all other factors (0.2). We might 
therefore reflect on difference between the degree of causal contribution of a factor and its 
impact on the severity of the blunder. 
 
Conclusion 
  
Our study featured projects that shared one common feature, namely a high reversal cost. This 
reversal cost could either be seen in terms of project abandonment or in terms of political 
cost. Such a common feature may contrast our study with other episodes of ‘disaster’. 
However, there are nevertheless some broader insights that emerge from our analysis. One is 
that constitutional politics do not seem to matter, at least not in the ways emphasised by the 
single country literature. That is, different political systems resorted to highly complex 
technical fixes, they were attracted by mega-events, and they were prone to cost and time 
overruns. This suggests that the widespread criticism regarding the British political system (or 
any other) in terms of being blunderprone requires further consideration. 
 
A further insight is that our study pointed to elements of hyper-excited politics, but less in the 
sense of moral panics and over-excitable politicians reacting to problems on the fly than 
systems being open to the temptation of engaging in iconic and legacy politics. This means 
that the pull of a high prestige building, or a technological fix that would not resolve domestic 
issues, but could also be exportable, was a wide-spread feature. Failure due to attempts at 
reputational and prestige policy wins features commonly across systems, but especially so in 
the German cases. In addition, those projects that reflect particularly prominent 'solutions 
hunting for problems' (usually involving law and order, such as 'welfare abuse') seem open to 
policy disasters, as solutions become the end rather than the means in policy-making. 
However, we do not find that particular instruments are prone to failures, as we observe 
different organisational forms, with both state and industry-led projects in our sample.  
 
In other words our study suggests, first of all, that blundering is not an inherently system-
specific feature, but one that recurs across systems. This suggests an element of active choice 
or agency. This agency is, in turn, met by the inherent limits of administration whose 
capacities are outgunned when faced with complexities and ambiguities of the kind of 
projects and policies discussed in this paper. Blaming national characteristics for blunders and 
failures may therefore offer support to calls for constitutional reform, whittling down of the 
state and outsourcing of its functions, and further denude politicians at the same time as 
absolving them from making choices. However, our cross-national study suggests that such 
an argument makes for poor and unsupported empirical analysis.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A1: Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Twenty-Three Policy Blunders 
 
Case Problem Hyper-Excited Politics Constitutional Politics Instrument Choice Administrative Capacity 
Berlin Brandenburg 
Airport 
Severity = 0.7 
Long-term delay in opening of 
new airport, technical problems 
with the structure relating to health 
and safety. High visibility, high 
cost/time overruns. 
Total cost of €5.4bn (estimated), 
escalated from an initial €2.9bn. 
Wider context at the outset. 
Initial enthusiasm in context of 
unification and subsequent 
move of capital.  
Need to maintain ‘low cost’ said 
to lead to under-capacity airport 
with high complexity 
technology. 
[0.7] 
Mixed project involving two Land 
governments and federal government, 
leading to accusation of responsibility 
diffusion; constitutional and 
administrative court reviews. 
 
 
[0.5] 
Highly constrained due to EU 
provisions.  
 
 
 
 
[0.3] 
Questions about lack of oversight 
over project.  
Delivery capacity also limited as no 
overall oversight 
 
 
[0.9] 
Toll Collect, Germany 
Severity = 0.3 
Delay in introduction of scheme in 
the early 2000s, accusation that 
private providers didn’t inform 
federal government regarding 
initial problems. Tribunal into this 
continues until the present day. 
Consortium has been renewed 
until 2018; fails to shape traffic 
flows and technical option has not 
been exported. 
Court battle over €7.5bn 
Initially seen as advancing 
German competitiveness and 
industry as well as ‘model’ for 
public private partnerships – 
signing shortly before 2002 
election was to be ‘success’ and 
promise of extra-income; claim 
that without projected income 
Germany might violate 
Maastricht criteria. 
[0.7] 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
[0] 
Private consortium 
allocation/contractual relations 
seen as highly problematic and 
lead to continuous legal 
challenges.  
First round had failed initially. 
 
 
[0.5]  
Accusation that deal favours private 
consortium; internal criticism 
overruled by minister; need to 
deliver ‘contract’ means no 
enforcement powers over private 
consortium. 
 
 
[0.5] 
  
Elbe Philharmonie, 
Germany 
Severity = 0.5 
Considerable delay and overspend 
of concert hall building in 
Hamburg – initial plan to spend 
€3.5m for internal ‘skin’ – only 
provider charges €31m – then 
Hamburg searches on its own 
€15m, state insurances firm 
against bankruptcy; €44m cost 
overrun. 
Initial estimate €241m; current 
estimate €789. 
Prestige building in previously 
declining part of the city. 
 
 
 
 
[0.7] 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
[0] 
Initial promise that building 
wouldn’t cost anything apart from 
‘donation’ of the land plus 
allowing hotel/flats (40m) – 
donations made €68.3m. Adoption 
of initial proposal without any 
competition and use of initial 
architects for project planning. 
Company bids with too low price 
to win contract 
[0.5] 
Rege (loco) loses control over 
process, gets overwhelmed by 
changes by architect. 
 
 
 
 
[0.7] 
Eurofighter 
Severity = 0.3 
Delayed project with ongoing 
technical problems, cost overruns 
(estimate €16.8bn instead of 
€14.7bn - initially 130m per plane, 
by 1997: 180 planes for €11.8bn) 
and doubled per/hour flying cost 
(€80k); initial plans: 1988 with 
first flight 1997 - first flight 2006. 
No. More a product of close 
relationship between politics 
and military-industrial complex 
(in late 1980s Bavaria part-
owner of manufacturer). 
 
[0.3] 
No 
(European wide construction/ conflict 
with UK/France and ongoing 
politics/corruption allegation over 
deals/failure of deals. demands by UK 
(capture by Rolls Royce) add 
complexity and further cost driver) 
[0] 
No 
 
 
 
 
[0] 
Lack of expert oversight in 
manufacturer to control quality - 
problems are found by safety 
regulator. 
Closeness of Ministry of Defence to 
industry. 
 
[0.7] 
Sydney Opera House 
(1955-1973) 
Severity = 0.7 
Massively over-budget (cost 
overrun of 1,400%); completed ten 
years later than originally planned. 
Support for the project from 
NSW Government and Premier. 
Keenness to get project started 
meant that construction started 
while designs were still being 
drawn up. 
 
 
[0.5] 
No. Project led by state government 
(NSW Government) and financed 
through a state lottery. 
 
 
 
 
[0.1] 
Design competition (1955-1957). 
Private project construction firm 
Civil & Civic and engineers Ove 
Arup and Partners. Technical 
difficulties in the construction of 
the iconic ‘shells’ of the Opera 
House roof (the geometry was not 
defined in Utzon’s original 
designs). 
[0.9] 
A breakdown in relations between 
the architect, Jørn Utzon, and the 
NSW government led him to resign 
from the project – forced out by 
Minister for Public Works, Davis 
Hughes (a situation Utzon described 
as ‘Malice in Blunderland’). Utzon 
was replaced – with the upheaval 
affecting the design of the building, 
costs and time for completion. 
[0.7] 
  
Edinburgh Trams project 
(2003-2014) 
Severity = 0.9 
Originally costed at £375 million 
(2003), estimated final cost over 
£1 billion (cost overrun of almost 
300%).  
Completion dates slipped from 
2011 to 2014 (three years). 
2/3rd of planned lines built 
City Council was intent on 
construction of a tram network 
(also fitted with climate change 
agenda). 
 
 
 
[0.3] 
No. Project initiated by the Labour-led 
Scottish Executive in 2003 (devolved 
government).  
SNP minority government tried to 
scrap the project after it was elected in 
2007, but was blocked by the other 
parties. 
 
[0.3] 
Utility diversion work proved to 
be more complex than originally 
anticipated. Changes were made to 
the planned route. Edinburgh city 
centre was left gridlocked by 
“catastrophic failure” of traffic 
management. 
 
[0.7] 
Major dispute between Transport 
Initiatives Edinburgh (TIE), the 
arms-length company (owned by the 
City of Edinburgh Council) 
responsible and its main contractor 
(Bilfinger Berger). Lack of 
experience or skills on board of TIE 
to oversee the Tram project. 
Company was eventually scrapped. 
A judge-led inquiry into the fiasco 
was launched in 2014. 
[0.9] 
Scottish Parliament at 
Holyrood (1997-2004) 
Severity = 0.9 
Cost overrun of 1,000%, 
completed three years late. 
Political desire to fast track the 
project. Experience in 1970s of 
halted devolution led to ‘lock-
in’ of the project. Symbolic 
importance of new parliament 
led to preference for ‘quality 
over cost’ in planning. Rush to 
deliver the project led to an 
under-estimation of risk. Over-
optimistic estimation of the cost 
on incomplete information. 
[0.7] 
Newly established system of devolved 
government in Scotland.  
 
 
 
 
 
[0.1] 
Publicly financed, contractors 
secured through tendering process, 
a joint venture between EMBT 
and RMJM Ltd. 
Fast-tracking procurement, instead 
of PFI, left project open to risk. 
 
 
[0.9] 
Procurement process led the project 
to ‘cost what it cost’. 
Major changes in the client 
requirement for the area and layout 
of parts of the building. 
 
 
 
[0.7] 
Boston’s Big Dig (1982-
2007) 
Severity = 0.7 
Cost overrun of 500%, completion 
date slipped from 1998 to 2007 
(nine years late). Problems with 
construction standards, safety and 
fraud by contractors. 
Limited political intervention in 
the project. Presidential veto in 
1982, but appropriation given 
Congressional approval soon 
after. 
 
 
 
[0.1] 
Federal funding of construction works, 
delivered through a partnership 
between the Massachusetts Turnpike 
Authority and private programme 
manager Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff. 
 
 
[0.1] 
Once decision was taken to build a 
subterranean highway (central 
artery/tunnel) for Boston’s road 
infrastructure system, the project 
was irreversible. The Big Dig was 
a highly technically challenging 
infrastructure project. Problems 
with the tunnel such as leaks and 
structural fissures.  
[0.9] 
Discovered that leaks were due to 
poor construction standards by 
contractors. Legal dispute with the 
contractors over the construction 
quality, cost overruns and safety 
violations (led to payout of around 
$450 million). 
 
[0.5] 
  
Olympic Stadium, 
Montreal (1970-1976) 
Severity = 1.0 
Cost overrun of 1,250%; problems 
with completion; labour disputes 
disrupted progress of the project; 
inflation of the cost of building 
materials.  
Strong lobbying for the project 
from Jean Drapeau, Mayor of 
Montreal, renowned for 
ambitious projects by the City. 
Over-confidence that event 
would be self-financing.  
 
 
[0.7] 
Olympic projects were overseen by the 
Montreal City Government and Private 
Bid Corporation. ‘Self-financing 
model’ under the Organizing 
Committee for the Olympic Games 
(COJO ’76), but with financial 
guarantees from the City of Montreal. 
 
[0.3] 
Choice of complex designs for the 
venues (stadium-pool-velodrome 
complex) and use of pioneering 
construction techniques were a 
factor in delays and cost overruns. 
Project also suffered from scope 
creep of technical specification. 
 
[0.9] 
Changes in technical specification of 
Velodrome (due to subsoil), 
commodity price inflation and 
general price shocks. 
Failure to identify unstable sub-soil 
(missed by geological surveys). 
Under-estimation of the cost of 
materials/labour costs (inflation) and 
danger of work stoppages. 
[0.7] 
Olympic Games and 
Venues, London (2003-
12) 
Severity = 0.3 
Cost overrun of 290% on the 
overall budget; cost overrun of c. 
200%% on the Olympic Stadium 
(from £280 million to £547 
million), and 400% on the 
Aquatics Centre (from £75 million 
to £313 million). Bailouts needed 
for commercial development of 
the Olympic Village and Media 
Centre, and shortage of security 
personnel. 
Cross-party support for 
London’s bid, but received 
support both of Tony Blair and 
London mayor Ken Livingstone 
in final lobbying of the IOC 
membership. 
 
[0.5] 
Olympic Organizing Committee 
financed through commercial 
activities. Financing of infrastructure 
by government, to be delivered by 
private consortia. Government as 
‘backer of last resort’ for all Olympic 
projects. 
 
[0.3] 
Shortfalls in private financing of 
both the Olympic Village and 
infrastructure for the Olympic park 
due to the global financial crisis 
(investors returned after the 
downturn had eased). 
 
[0.5] 
Omission of predictable costs from 
the original estimates, and simple 
flaws such as exclusion of VAT and 
security costs led to growth of the 
budget. Growth of the budget also 
resulted from the addition of a large 
programme contingency (£2.2 
billion).  
[0.7] 
Millennium Dome 
(1992-2001) 
Severity = 0.5 
Cost overrun of just 4% on the 
project, but 57% increase in public 
cost; major political fiasco 
(Opening Night left journalists and 
VIPs waiting in the cold for hours 
at Stratford station - ‘could not 
have gone worse without loss of 
life’); difficulty in finding a 
commercial buyer for the venue; 
highly negative media coverage. 
Tony Blair considered it the 
‘first paragraph’ of his re-
election manifesto, overriding 
majority of opposition from 
Cabinet. 
 
 
 
[0.7] 
Decision taken in Cabinet at instigation 
of the Prime Minister (Deputy Prime 
Minister ensured Cabinet backing). 
Transition between Major and Labour 
governments caused problems with 
project development (created high 
level of uncertainty in developing 
plans for millennium exhibition). 
[0.7] 
The New Millennium Experience 
Company (NMEC), financed 
through Millennium Commission 
grants and commercial revenues 
from ticket sales and sponsors. 
 
 
 
[0.5] 
Shortfalls against expected revenue 
from ticket sales and sponsorship. 
Additional grants from the 
Millennium Commission to keep the 
project afloat exceeded the cost of 
cancellation. 
 
 
[0.5] 
  
Concorde (1962-1976) 
Severity = 0.5 
Cost overrun of 1,100%. Symbolic concerns of British 
and French governments over 
demonstrating technological and 
engineering prowess. 
 
 
 
 
[0.5] 
Operated under the terms of an 
international treaty between the French 
and British Governments (rather than a 
contract between the companies), 
penalties for cancellation of the 
project.  
 
 
 
[0.1] 
Joint venture between private 
companies, British Aircraft 
Corporation (BAC) and 
Aérospatiale. 
Order cancellations due to a range 
of factors, in particular the effects 
of the 1973 oil crisis on the civil 
aviation industry, financial 
difficulties of airlines, 
environmental concerns and air 
show crash of the Soviet 
competitor aircraft. 
[0.7] 
Cost of cancellation cheaper than 
continuing with project known to be 
uneconomic (some uncertainty over 
legal liability according to the treaty 
between the countries). 
 
 
 
[0.7] 
Channel Tunnel (1981-
1994) 
Severity = 0.1 
Cost overrun of 80%; completed 
one year late. 
British Government not 
interested in funding the project. 
Supported private leadership of 
it. 
[0.1] 
No. 
 
[0.1] 
Privately financed venture, 
delivered on a ‘BOOT’ basis 
(build-own-operate-transfer). 
[0.1] 
Changes to the technical 
specification of the project in 
relation to environmental factors, 
safety and security. 
[0.7] 
Bibliothèque nationale de 
France 
Severity = 0.5 
Project hit by cost overruns and 
technical difficulties with its high 
rise design. 
Cost approaching $2 billion 
Project announced on 14 July 
1988, by President François 
Mitterrand. Large, ambitious 
project. One of the ‘Grand 
Projets’ of Francois Mitterand – 
programme to create modern 
monuments in Paris. Socialist 
government’s agenda focused 
on cultural politics/production. 
(Personally inspected materials 
used for the Louvre Pyramid). 
Crash contract so no new 
president could alter plans. 
[0.9] 
Presidential influence over the project 
a factor. Projects under the Ministry of 
Culture, overseen by a senior official 
Emile Biasini. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.3] 
Ambitious, technical designs using 
high quality materials. High rise 
design proved problematic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.7] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.0] 
  
Australian Parliament 
House (1978-1988) 
Severity = 0.5 
Original cost of the project was 
A$151 million (in 1978 prices), 
was quickly revised up to A$220 
million in 1980, with the actual 
final cost rising to $1.1 billion. 
Supposed to be completed by 26 
January 1988 (the bicentenary of 
European settlement of Australia) 
but finally opened 9 May 1998. 
New Parliament building 
conceived as a national symbol, 
coinciding with bicentennial 
celebrations. Decision was taken 
to ‘fast track’ the project, 
commencing construction before 
designs were finalized, in order 
to meet the opening date. 
“Many of the difficulties arose 
from the fast track system which 
the Authority adopted to try to 
meet the target data for 
completion” (Auditor-General 
1987). 
[0.7] 
Direct accountability of the Parliament 
House Construction Authority (PHCA) 
to Parliament and Cabinet via the 
Minister for the Capital Territory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.3] 
Early decision that the structure 
should be conventional (i.e. did 
not use pioneering technology). 
Project to be delivered through 
Parliament House Construction 
Authority (PHCA) as government 
body with overall responsibility. 
Scope creep in the technical 
specification; changes to user 
requirements were a major factor 
in cost overruns. 
 
 
[0.7] 
Omission of a contingency in the 
budget. Difficulties experienced in 
managing project architects (with 
designs often submitted late).Much 
of procurement relied upon a 
contractor managed a wide range of 
trade subcontracts. 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.5] 
  
Universal Credit (2010-) 
Severity = 0.7 
Originally due to launch nationally 
for new claimants in October 
2013, with aim of simplifying the 
system for working-age benefits. 
Universal Credit has been hit by 
delays and substantial write-offs of 
new IT systems. It was “reset” in 
early 2013 due to the Major 
Projects Authority raising serious 
concerns regarding programme 
implementation. Significant 
problems with the development of 
IT systems and processes led to 
delays in target date for national 
roll-out of the programme. 
Lack of clarity over whether the 
new IT systems will support the 
national roll-out, leading to an 
initial write-off of £34 million of 
new IT assets (NAO 2013, p. 7), 
and warnings that this figure may 
eventually increase. 
Universal Credit was one of the 
flagship reforms initiated under 
the Coalition Government, and 
launched at the Conservative 
Party conference in 2010. The 
scope of reforms and the 
timetables set were highly 
ambitious, reflecting the 
political importance of the 
policy. Universal Credit was the 
signature policy of Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions, 
Iain Duncan Smith (sole holder 
of this portfolio between 2010 
and 2015).  
Also alleged that the Minister or 
his aides have briefed against 
the DWP permanent secretary 
(New Statesman, 11 April 
2014). 
“When setting up the 
programme the Department 
adopted an ambitious timetable 
for national roll-out from 
October 2013.” (NAO 2013, 
p.7). 
“The programme has been 
subject to high levels of 
ministerial and senior 
departmental engagement from 
the outset. Since October 2012, 
departmental ministers and the 
Permanent Secretary, met 
weekly to review progress.” 
(NAO 2013, p. 37). 
[0.5] 
The Welfare Reform Act delegated 
operational details of Universal Credit 
to statutory instruments. 
Legislative oversight of the project has 
been limited by a lack of cooperation 
from the Department of Work and 
Pensions in the provision of accurate, 
timely and detailed information.  
“Effective scrutiny by select 
committees relies on government 
departments providing them with 
accurate, timely and detailed 
information. This has not always 
happened to date in relation to our 
scrutiny of the problems with 
Universal Credit implementation.” 
(Work and Pensions Committee 2014, 
p. 25). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.3] 
Choice of a universal integrated 
system involved substantial scale 
and complexity. In development of 
the programme, discovered that 
some new IT systems were unable 
to be integrated with the new 
digital system for Universal 
Credit. 
Concerns raised that the new 
system is unable to handle changes 
in circumstances and complicated 
cases, so these will have to be 
processed manually.  
“Throughout the programme the 
Department has lacked a detailed 
view of how Universal Credit is 
meant to work.” (NAO 2013, p.8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.7] 
The senior leadership of Universal 
Credit experienced a high rate of 
turnover, while more generally 
“lacked IT expertise” (NAO 2013, p. 
35). The DWP was criticized by the 
National Audit Office of having a 
“good news” reporting culture and 
operating under a “fortress 
mentality”. 
“Since mid-2012, the Department 
has experienced high turnover in the 
senior leadership of Universal 
Credit.... Including the reset and the 
current director general for 
Universal Credit, the programme 
has had five different senior 
responsible owners since mid-2012.” 
(NAO 2013, p. 9). 
“The Department ring-fenced the 
Universal Credit team and allowed it 
to work with a large degree of 
independence. Major Projects 
Authority and supplier-led reviews in 
mid-2012 identified a ‘fortress’ 
mentality within the programme 
team and a ‘good news’ reporting 
culture” (NAO 2013, p. 8). 
 
 
 
 
[0.9] 
  
Collapse of the West 
Coast Main Line rail 
franchise competition 
(2011-2014) 
Severity = 0.3 
Decision to award the West Coast 
Main Line rail franchise to 
FirstGroup scrapped by the 
government after “significant 
technical flaws” in the process of 
procurement.  
Failure of the franchise 
competition incurred £2.7 million 
in professional fees related to 
judicial review of the decision, in 
addition to £4.3 million in costs of 
reviews commissioned from 
external advisers. 
Estimated cost of reimbursing the 
four bidders around £40 million. 
Over-ambitious policy in view 
of departmental capacity and 
resources. Political haste by new 
government in introducing 
major reform to the franchising 
regime. 
PASC noted “lessons for 
ministers in terms of more 
realistically matching policy 
ambition to departmental 
capacity and resources” (PASC 
2013, p. 3) 
"Embarking on an ambitious, 
perhaps unachievable, reform of 
franchising, in haste, on the 
UK’s most complex piece of 
railway was irresponsible and 
involved such an element of risk 
that greater senior executive 
oversight and relevant technical 
expertise was required. (pp.10-
11)  
[0.5] 
Institutional structures were in place 
for assurance, but little attention to 
procurement: “scant attention paid by 
the DfT’s board and executive 
committee to rail franchising” (PASC 
2013, p. 8). Failures due to internal 
processes/checks not having worked, 
not due constitutional design. 
"The discretionary adjustment of the 
figures, to the benefit of First Group, 
clearly opened the DfT to legal 
challenge from Virgin Trains. Officials 
and advisers knew that this risk existed 
but did not provide sufficient warning 
of it to senior civil servants and 
ministers. Indeed, misleading 
information, that the SLF figures had 
been derived from the model, was fed 
up the chain" (PASC 2013, p.7) 
 
 
[0.1] 
The invitation to tender for the 
franchise was issued before any 
decision was taken on how to 
calculate ‘subordinated loan 
facilities’ (SLF) (capital provided 
by the bidder’s parent company to 
guarantee operator losses and 
protect government against risk of 
default).  
The DfT had not developed a tool 
to calculate the SLF. Instead it 
used an internal model. Officials 
used discretion to adjust figures, to 
the advantage of First Group (over 
Virgin Trains). Modelling was 
flawed (was expressed in real 
terms, when it should have been 
expressed in nominal cash terms). 
 
 
[0.7] 
At £5.5 billion, “probably the 
biggest single contract DfT had ever 
attempted to award” (PASC 2013, p. 
7). 
Policy disaster attributed to failures 
of governance: “there were no senior 
staff directly involved with the 
procurement project, no one person 
clearly in charge, and a lack of 
senior oversight of the project team” 
(PASC 2013, p. 8). Project was 
given a green rating by the Major 
Projects Authority after a review of 
the franchise competition. 
DfT suffered from considerable 
turnover of senior staff, lack of 
management oversight and 
ownership of the franchise, internal 
governance of the project was 
confused (NAO 2012, p. 8). 
 
[0.9] 
  
Carrier Strike, UK 
(2007-2020) 
Severity = 0.7 
In 2007, the Ministry of Defence 
agreed a programme to deliver two 
aircraft carriers, completed in 
2016 and 2018 at a cost of £3.65 
billion. The decision of the newly 
elected Coalition Government in 
2010 to switch to a different sort 
of aircraft/carrier combination led 
to an increase in forecast costs of 
around £2 billion, resulting in a U-
turn. Switching back to the 
original aircraft type led to £74 
million being written-off, and a 
delay of when the carrier would be 
completed to 2020. 
Beyond this, there has been a total 
cost increase for Carrier Strike of 
£2.6 billion (NAO 2014, p. 13). 
Reversal of a decision by the 
previous government by the 
Coalition was part of defence 
cuts under its programme of 
austerity introduced hastily in 
2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.5] 
Change to policy by new government 
typical of claims regarding the 
adversarial nature of policy-making in 
the British system. Lack of checks and 
balances over the review of defence 
spending in 2010, combined with a 
lack of transparency and rushed 
process, was linked to mistakes in the 
decision-making process. However, the 
cost of the U-turn (£74 million) is 
dwarfed by the other cost increases on 
the project (£2.6 billion) due to 
technical factors. 
“The Department attributed these 
mistakes, which have cost taxpayers at 
least £74 million, to the process being 
rushed and secret.” (PASC 2013, p. 5). 
 
[0.3] 
In 2014, the NAO reported that 
“the cost increase on Carriers is 
largely driven by technical 
factors” (NAO 2014, p. 13). These 
included increases in labour, 
warehousing and storage costs due 
to delays in the air carriers 
entering service,  and scope creep 
across a range of aspects of the 
project, such as designs and 
material costs.  
“The Department admitted that 
while interoperability with the 
French and the Americans 
remains a priority, the ability to 
land the carrier variant aircraft on 
other nation’s aircraft carriers 
had proven to be more technically 
difficult than previously thought.” 
(PASC 2013, p. 8). 
[0.5] 
During the 2010 Strategic Defence 
and Security Review (SDSR) the 
option of switching to the carrier 
variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, 
and as a result had to generate cost 
estimates quickly on the basis of 
insufficient information (PASC 
2013, p. 7). By February 2012, the 
estimated cost of converting the 
aircraft carrier has risen from £500-
800 million to £2 billion. Under-
estimation of costs was “the result of 
omitting predictable costs, such as 
the costs of planning the conversion, 
and basic errors which included 
omitting VAT and inflation from the 
costs of converting the carriers” 
(PASC 2013, p. 8). 
 
[0.7] 
Transrapid, Germany 
Severity = 0.3 
Maglev technology has been tested 
since 1969, but was abandoned in 
2012, following failure to 
introduce it into German system; 
one operating system in China 
(Shanghai); costs difficult to 
determine: €700m by 1989; 
planned line Berlin - Hamburg 
increased to €7.5bn (others say 
10bn) - abandoned. Cost estimates 
3bn not 1.85bn for munich airport 
link leads to abandonment. €800m 
from 1970-2012 for test track. 
Hyper-excited politics on 
various occasions, most 
famously Edmund Stoiber’s 
enthusiasm as Bavarian prime 
minister for service to airport 
(https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=f7TboWvVERU). 
Regularly championed as 
symbol of German industrial 
innovation - promotion of high 
tech for export. 
 
 
[0.9] 
Intergovernmental financing of the 
project leads ultimately to the 
abandonment of the project - earlier 
abandonment due to Deutsche Bahn 
criticism (unwillingness to carry 
operational risks). 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.7] 
Highly optimistic costings that are 
not updated to reflect rise in 
construction costs/compliance 
costs regarding environmental 
regulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.3] 
Lack of understanding of cost 
reductions in air travel and 
technological potential in 
conventional rail travel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.3] 
  
Stuttgart 21, Germany 
Severity = 0.7 
Ongoing railway station re-
construction leading to 
considerable political change - 
green/red coalition government in 
Land, change in mayor in 
Stuttgart. Public protests, public 
conciliation process and 
referendum - supports construction 
- cost estimate €6.5bn by 2012 
(estimate 2010: 4.5bn), campaigns 
in 2009 with 2004 figures: 3.1bn. 
First announcement: 1994. 
Not high - but supporters 
highlight that railway station 
and its redesign is essential for 
local/regional competitiveness. 
 
[0.5] 
Intergovernmental politics despite 
railways being a ‘federal’ matter.  
 
 
[0.5] 
None - conflict over plans and 
early construction, not overall 
project delivery. 
 
 
[0.1] 
Mostly lack of control within 
Deutsche Bahn. 
 
 
[0.3] 
Electronic Health Card, 
Germany 
Severity = 0.3 
Mandatory cards for all those with 
statutory insurance - does not 
deliver the information required, 
just personal information; cost 
(since 2006) until 2015: €1bn. 
Main change to existing card: 
picture ID, health information 
from 2018. 
Limited political interest, largely 
to promote networked health 
services and less abuse. 
 
 
 
[0.3] 
Largely a conflict in autonomous 
sector, no involvement by federal 
government; civil rights protection 
meant no political support - 
accusations that opposition by doctors 
largely about protecting own 
privileges. 
 
[0.1] 
Operating company delivering 
project criticised for relying on 
industry with earlier failures. Main 
issue was the complexity of PIN 
numbers that is seen as patient 
unfriendly and useless 
information/outdated technology. 
 
[0.3] 
None 
 
 
 
 
[0] 
National Identity Card 
Scheme (2002-2010), 
UK 
Severity = 0.7 
Scheme scrapped in May 2010, 
having cost an estimated £4.5 
billion during its lifetime, never 
having been fully rolled out. 
Plans for an identity card 
scheme announced by the Home 
Secretary in July 2002 in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and 
increased concern over the 
threat of terrorism. 
 
Political pressures resulted in  
changes in project scope: 
“changing focus has resulted in 
a lack of clarity regarding the 
likely technology requirements” 
(PASC 2006. 19). 
 
[0.7] 
Proposals were introduced without 
proper consultation. ID cards scheme 
was eventually abandoned after change 
in government in 2010. (Chair of the 
PASC was not permitted to inspect the 
risk register of the ID cards 
programme.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[0.1] 
ID cards scheme was initially 
intended to be based on a 
centralized computer database. 
(This plan was later abandoned, 
with information being stored on 
three existing systems.) Danger of 
“function creep” for the database 
(Home Affairs Committee 2004, p. 
X), with new components added in 
relation to other policies (e.g. ID 
cards for foreign nationals). 
 
 
 
[0.7] 
Reliance of the Home Office on 
external expertise in ICT (PASC 
2006, p. 64). It paid PA Consulting 
£14.2 million for work on the ID 
cards scheme “because it did not 
have “ready access to certain skill 
sets and resources necessary for 
implementation of a large and  
complex project such as Identity 
Cards” (PASC 2006, p. 11). 
 
 
 
 
[0.7] 
  
Sochi 2014 Winter 
Olympics (2007-2014), 
Russia  
Severity = 0.7 
Cost escalated from the planned 
$12 billion to over $51 billion (an 
increase of around 400%). 
Project conceived as a grand 
legacy project for President 
Putin, and as a high prestige 
global event.  
 
 
[0.9] 
Clientalistic politics whereby private 
investors in Olympic venues were able 
to transfer their toxic assets to the state 
after the event to avoid losses. State 
disinterested or unable to act against 
corruption (e.g. kickbacks).  
[0.7] 
Ambitious designs for venues and 
infrastructure of the Games. 
Delays in completion of the ski 
jump (site for the ski jump was 
technically challenging due to 
unstable subsoil). 
[0.5] 
Problems with corruption and 
embezzlement contributed to cost 
overruns. Relative absence of cost 
controls or careful management due 
to Sochi being a prestige/legacy 
project for the president.  
[0.3] 
 
 
 
 
